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RICO AND THE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION CLAUSE
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)1 is potentially the broadest statute Congress has passed to
combat the harmful effects of organized crime.2 Proscribing certain activities related to racketeering, 3 RICO contains an array of
potent criminal sanctions, 4 and civil and antitrust-type remedies.1 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. IIl 1979). RICO is one of twelve substantive
titles in the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23. See
Title I, Special Grand jury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334 (1976); Title II, General Immunity, id.
§§ 6001-6005; Title ilI, Recalcitrant Witnesses, 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1976); Title IV, False
Declarations, 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976); Title V, Protected Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses, id. § 3481; Title VI, Depositions, id. § 3503; Title VII, Litigation Concerning Sources of Evidence, id. § 3504; Title VIII, Syndicated Gambling, id. §§ 1511, 1955;
Title IX, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, id. §§ 1961-1968; Title X,
Dangerous Special Offender Sentencing, id. §8 3575-3578; Title XI, Regulation of Explosives, id. §§ 841-848; Title XII, National Commission on Individual Rights, id. § 3331.
2 This Note uses the term "organized crime" in its generic rather than popular sense.
Senator McClellan, one of the principal sponsors of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970, defined "organized crime" as "a functional concept like 'white-collar crime,' serving
simply as a shorthand method of referring to a large and varying group of criminal offenses committed in diverse circumstances." McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) Or
Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 60-61 (1970). Organized
crime, as used in this Note, includes white-collar crime, organized crime in the popular
sense (Mafia, Cosa Nostra), and other group activities proscribed by RICO.
3 Section 1962 of RICO contains four substantive provisions. First, the section prohibits using income derived from racketeering activities to acquire or establish an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1976). For a critical discussion
of § 1962(a), see Note, Investing Dirty Money: Section 1962(a) of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970, 83 YALE L.J. 1491 (1974). Second, § 1962 outlaws the acquisition of any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce through a "pattern of racketeering activity." 18
U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1976). Third, it proscribes conducting an enterprise's affairs through a
"pattern of racketeering activity." Id. § 1962(c). Finally, the section outlaws conspiracies to
violate any of the three previous provisions. Id. § 1962(d).
4 Section 1963 authorizes maximum sanctions of up to a $25,000 fine, 20 years in
prison, or both. More important, the statute authorizes forfeiture of any interest in an
enterprise that the violator acquired or maintained in violation of § 1962. 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(1976).
Although the penalties seem severe, the statute requires the government to prove the
violation of at least two racketeering acts. These acts are among the most serious state and
federal offenses. Moreover, the violation of any individual predicate crime would potentially subject the convicted offender to harsh penalties roughly proportional to those provided in RICO. See Note, supra note 3, at 1493-94.
s The section on civil remedies provides in part:
(a) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent
and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate
orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of
any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not
limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor
as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign
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To strengthen RICO's effectiveness, Congress included a unique
liberal construction clause, 6 mandating that "the provisions of this
title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." Most courts have followed the directive and interpreted
RICO broadly." Some commentators and courts, however, have
commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making
due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
(b) The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. In
any action brought by the United States under this section, the court shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination thereof. Pending
final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining
orders or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of
satisfactory performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United
States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the
cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C. § 19 64(a)-(c) (1976).
Except for § 1961, which provides definitional terms, the remaining sections of RICO
are procedural. Section 1964(d) provides collateral estoppel benefits from any RICO conviction to the government in a subsequent civil proceeding against a convicted defendant.
Section 1965 provides venue and process requirements. The expedition of RICO actions is
permitted under § 1966. Section 1967 authorizes the court to hold open or closed proceedings at its discretion. Under § 1968 the Attorney General has the power to issue a civil
investigative demand. Congress designed this section to afford prosecutors extensive presuit investigative powers, but the Attorney General has never used the provision. In fact,
the Justice Department recommends that it not be used:
It [Civil Investigative Demand] has never been used and we recommend
that it not be employed in a racketeering investigation. In essence, we believe
that a racketeering investigation is basically a criminal investigation which
utilizes an investigative Grand Jury. If a civil action is warranted, it usually will
proceed after the successful conclusion of a criminal case where the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is in operation. Even if a civil action is initiated independently of a criminal investigation, we believe that the Civil Investigative Demand would not prove useful and that the same goals could be achieved by
means of the regular process of civil discovery.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND COR-

66-67 (4th ed.).
6 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947. No
other statute in the UnitedStates Code that imposes criminal penalties has a liberal construction directive.
RUPT ORGANIZATIONS STATUTE

7

Id.

I See, e.g., United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 1980) ("enterprise" broadly construed to include organizations engaged in solely illegal activities such as
prostitution); United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682 (7th Cir. 1979) ("enterprise" broadly
construed to include public entities such as the Madison, Illinois Police Department), cert.
denied, 100 S.Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979) ("enterprise" broadly construed to include organizations engaged in solely illicit activities such as
extortion and murder), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1345 (1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593
F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("enterprise" broadly construed to include a restaurant used as
a front for trafficking in cocaine), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Davis,
576 F.2d 1065, 1067 (3d Cir.) ("[T]he words 'chargeable under State law' in § 1961(1)(A)
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advocated a narrow construction, asserting that the statute is ambiguous and spreads the criminal net too wide. 9 These critics
misunderstand the nature of statutory ambiguity, flout the congressional directive, and misuse legislative history in their attempt
to justify a narrow construction of RICO. The plain meaning of
the statute should govern unless manifest ambiguity exists. When
ambiguities arise, however, courts should obey the liberal construction directive.
I
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Courts resolve legislative ambiguities through, the process of
statutory construction. In interpreting an ambiguous statute,
courts must choose whether to construe the ambiguity liberally or
strictly.' 0 The effect of strictly construing criminal statutes is to
resolve ambiguities against the state in favor of the defendant."1
This does not mean, however, that the court must accord the
statutory language its narrowest possible meaning."2 If a statute
mean 'chargeable under State law at the time the offense was committed.'"), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 836 (1978); United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1137 (3d Cir. 1977) ("[Bly
systematic paying of bribes to public official and employees, those making payments committed 'act[s] ... involving ... bribery' within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A). The
word 'involving' ... is broad enough to reach the conduct of owners and employees of a
corrupt enterprise."); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976) (RICO's
remedies and prohibitions "extend to an illegitimate business as well as a legitimate one
.. "), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
9 See United States v. Turkette, No. 79-1545, slip op. at 6-7 (Sept. 23, 1980); United
States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1365 (8th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he term 'enterprise' does not
encompass an illegal association that is proved only by facts which also establish the predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity.' "); United States v. Sutton, 605
F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979) (RICO not applicable where persons engaged in racketeering
activity unrelated to any legitimate organization), vacated and submitted for rehearing en banc
April 2, 1980; United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in part,
vacated and remanded in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Moeller, 402 F.
Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975) (RICO "enterprise" must be a lawful business enterprise.). See
generally Comment, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues
Arising In Its Interpretation,27 DE PAUL L. REV. 89 (1977); Comment, Organized Crime and the
Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies For "Criminal Activity", 124 U. PA. L. REV. 192
(1975); Note, supra note 3, at 1491-515.
10 "The attitudes of judges toward legislation being construed, whether they are liberally or strictly disposed toward it, can have an important influence on how it is construed."
2A C.D. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.01 (rev. 3d ed. 1973) (footnote omitted).
11 See Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 748, 749
(1935).
12
We are mindful of the maxim that penal statutes are to be strictly construed. And we would not hesitate, present any compelling reason, to apply it
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has two reasonable meanings consistent with the legislature's intent, then the court applies the meaning most beneficial to the
defendant. In contrast, when liberally construing a statute, a court
gives an expansive, rather than restrictive, interpretation to the
language in question.
If a statute is not ambiguous, courts should accord the language its plain meaning.1 3 There is no need for liberal or strict
and accept the restricted interpretation. But no such reason is to be found
here. The canon in favor of strict construction is not an inexorable command
to override common sense and evident statutory purpose. It does not require
magnified emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give it a meaning contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining language. As was
said in United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 530, the canon "does not require
distortion or nullification of the evident meaning and purpose of the legislation." Nor does it demand that a statute be given the "narrowest meaning"; it
is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.
United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1947).
"' Courts often invoke the plain meaning rule to exclude the use of external aids of
construction on the ground that "[i]f the court decides that the meaning of the words is
'plain', then, of course, . . . 'interpretation' is unnecessary .... " Willis, Statute Interpretationin
a Nutshell, 16 CAN. B. REV. 1, 4 (1938). The Supreme Court enunciated the plain meaning doctrine in Caminette v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917):
[Wihen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression
of legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by considerations drawn from titles or designating names or reports accompanying their
introduction, or from any extraneous source.... [T]he language being plain,
and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole
evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.
Id. at 490 (footnotes omitted).
Yet the Court seemingly sounded the death knell of the plain meaning rule in United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 3 10 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940): "When aid to construction
of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of
law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.'" Nevertheless, the frequent invocation of the plain meaning rule today suggests its
miraculous resurrection, if indeed it ever died. See, e.g., United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 184 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The plain language of
the Suits in Admirality Act authorizes anyone to sue the United States for damages ....
There is no need to inquire further .... "); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 217
(1976) ("[Tlhere is no ambiguity in the words of § 922(h) [of the Gun Control Act of
1968], and there is no justification for indulging in uneasy statutory construction.");
Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974) ("We perceive no grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the [Gun Control] Act. The statute
... clearly proscribes petitioner's conduct..."). See generally Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die:
The "Plain-MeaningRule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75
COLutM. L. REv. 1299 (1975); 2A C.D. SANDS, supra note 10, at § 46.01. One commentator
explains:
A strong case can be made for the proposition that all words are inherently
ambiguous, and that no statute or other statement in words can be absolutely
free of ambiguity.
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construction when the words of the statute are clear. Of course,
there are degrees of ambiguity, and it is difficult to draw the
sometimes fine line between "plain" and "ambiguous" language.
Nonetheless, the labeling process is often crucial; it determines
whether the court will apply the plain meaning rule or resort to
other constructional aids.1 4 The attitude with which a court approaches its analysis of a statute is of the utmost importance. 1"5
The scope of the plain meaning rule is narrow because
statutory ambiguity,"6 or equivocation,1 7 is virtually ubiquitous. A

If no statute can be perfectly plain, should the plain meaning rule be
abolished? Not necessarily. Although no statute may be absolutely unambiguous, the degree of ambiguity in most statutes is very slight when applied to
most situations. The degree of ambiguity is likely to be substantial only in limited peripheral sets of situations. The result is that to a large extent statutes
are substantially plain, so plain that except in marginal situations it would be a
ridiculous forcing of a statute to put more than one meaning on the statutory
language. For purposes of interpretation, a vast area of plain meaning exists. If
the term plain in the plain meaning rule is understood as plain beyond reasonable question, then the rule makes sense, although admittedly a problem arises
as to what is reasonable doubt or substantial lack of ambiguity.
Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 KAN. L. REv. 1, 12-13
(1954) (footnotes omitted).
"4 Extrinsic aids are available to the courts when interpreting statutes. Some of these
aids are more useful than others and many conflict. See generally 2A C.D. SANDS, supra note
10. Karl Llewellyn, in a renowned article, noted, "When it comes to presenting a proposed
construction in court, there is an accepted conventional vocabulary. As in argument over
points of case-law, the accepted convention still, unhappily, requires discussion as if only
one single correct meaning could exist. Hence there are two opposing canons on almost
every point." Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). Professor Llewellyn
laid out 28 different "thrusts" and "parries" that a lawyer could use to influence a court's
approach to statutory construction. See id. at 401-06.
15 There is something of a dispute among those who like to speculate on the
workings of the judicial mind as to whether courts first decide how a defective
statute ought to be interpreted and then display whatever canons of statutory
construction will make this interpretation look inevitable, or whether the courts
actually first use the applicable canons and second reach the result. Doutbless
the truth lies somewhere in between-some judges are apt to do it one way,
some the other; some cases lend themselves to one technique, some to the
other. It is no doubt true that, as applied to a particular fact situation, several
rules of interpretation may often be referred to, some looking in one direction
and some in the opposite direction. It is also true that most of the rules are
stated in a way which ends with the exception that the rule does not apply if
the meaning of the statute is clear, but a good deal of discretion remains in the
courts as to when a statute is clear and when it is ambiguous. At all events,... rules
of statutory interpretation sometimes do decide cases.
W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-r, CRIMINAL LAW-70 (1972) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
16 Professor Dickerson distinguishes three kinds of statutory ambiguity:
Semantic ambiguity is uncertainty of multiple meaning that tends to follow
particular words and phrases (e.g., "residence," "child") into the contexts of
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certain amount of ambiguity is inevitable because words are imperfect vessels of meaning and thought.' Good statutory drafting cannot eliminate all ambiguities, because the drafter faces an
inescapable dilemma; he must design a statute general enough to
provide an adequate remedy for the evil the legislature seeks to
attack and yet specific enough to provide fair warning of what the
law prohibits. Our adversarial legal system contributes to the
problem; lawyers attempt to bend the statute toward the interpretation that best serves their clients' interests. Thus, attorneys often
scrutinize every word of a statute and its legislative history to find
or create an advantageous ambiguity.' 9 The competing arguments of counsel exert pressure on judicial decisionmaking, enhancing the likelihood that the court will find an ambiguity, and
influencing whether the court will construe a term liberally or
strictly.
The statutory scheme is entitled to the utmost deference because the words of the statute are the law, not the lawyer's
suggested construction, nor the legislative history accompanying

actual use. Syntactical ambiguity is uncertainty of modification or reference
(e.g., a squinting modifier). Contextual ambiguity is uncertainty as to how a
statement affects or is affected by another statement with which it is inconsistent (e.g., two inconsistent contemporaneous statutes). It also includes uncertainty as to whether a particular relevant tacit assumption has been made.
R.

DICKERSON,

THE INTERPRETATION

AND

APPLICATION OF STATUTES

283 (1975).

"Language is equivocal when it has 'different significations equally appropriate' or is
,capable of double interpretation,' that is, has two or more competing thrusts." Id. at 43-44
(footnote omitted).
I8 See Jones, Some Causes of Uncertainty in Statutes, 36 A.B.A.J. 321, 321 (1950). Statutes
are particularly susceptible to ambiguity because a "statute is an instrument of government
partaking of its practical purposes but also of its infirmities and limitations, of its awkward
and groping efforts." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 528 (1947).
19 Regardless of its cause, this lack of precision in [drafting] criminal statutes affords numerous opportunities for astute and zealous defense counsel to discover or to create ambiguity in the meaning of a statute and then to urge an
interpretation that will place the conduct of his client in a less unfavorable
light.
Quarles, Some Statutory ConstructionProblems and Approaches in CriminalLaw, 3 VAND. L. REV.
531, 531 (1950). Although the adversarial system seems to generate ambiguity, some of the
ambiguity may reflect uncertainty embedded in a particular statute:
If... the words [of a statute] are ambiguous enough to induce two people to
spend good money in backing two opposing views as to their meaning, no man
of sense would expect to find the question settled by a reference to such a vast
and vague field as the "rest of the words of the Act" or "the part of human
conduct with which the Act deals".
Willis, supra note 13, at 4-5.
17
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the act. 20 Thus, the first step of any court in applying a statute is
to determine what the words say. 2 1 When a court looks to legislative intent, it does so to derive the meaning of the words, not any
subjective legislative intent. 2 2 Furthermore, unless defined otherwise, words should be given their plain meaning. "If a statute is
written for ordinary folk, it would be arbitrary not to assume that
Congress intended its words to be read 'with the minds of ordinary men. If they are addressed to specialists, they must be read
by judges with the minds of the specialists." 23
In general, the judge should apply, rather than interpret, the
law. This leaves the legislature supreme in making the law,2 4 sub-

20 But see Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3

VAND. L. REV. 438, 440 (1950) ("[A] court is not compelled by what appears to be a clear,
literal interpretation to forego taking into account the common law or statutory
background, the social matrix, legislative history and the consequences of a literal interpretation .
2 See Lewis v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 915, 918 (1980) ("The Court has stated repeatedly of late that in any case concerning the interpretation of a statute the 'starting
point' must be the language of the statute itself."); Frankfurter, supra note 18, at 535-36.
22 Mr. justice Holmes wrote, "[W]hen counsel talked of the intention of a legislature, I
was indiscreet enough to say I don't care what their intention was. I only want to know what
the words mean." Frankfurter, supra note 18, at 538 (emphasis added).
justice Frankfurter observed:
Legislation has an aim; it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an inadequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of government. That
aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evinced in the
language of the statute, as read in the light of other external manifestations of
purpose. That is what the judge must seek and effectuate, and he ought not to
be led off the trail by tests that have overtones of subjective design. We are not
concerned with anything subjective. We do not delve into the mind of legislators or their draftsmen, or committee members. Against what he believed to
be such an attempt Cardozo once protested [dissenting in United States v. Constantina, 296 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1936)]:
"The judgment of the court, if I interpret the reasoning aright,
does not rest upon a ruling that Congress would have gone beyond
its power if the purpose that it professed was the purpose truly
cherished. The judgment of the court rests upon the ruling that
another purpose, not professed, may be read beneath the surface,
and by the purpose so imputed the statute is destroyed. Thus the
process of psycho-analysis has spread to unaccustomed fields. There
is a wise and ancient doctrine that a court will not inquire into the
motives of a legislative body..
Id. at 538-39.
23 Id. at 536.

24 "[S]ound rules of statutory interpretation exist to discover and not to direct the Congressional will." Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974) (quoting United
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542 (1943)). See 2A C.D. SANDS, supra note 10,
at §§ 45.03-.07. As Professor Sands observed:
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ject only to constitutional parameters. That is not to say that
judges should never interpret the law. The legislature does not
always draft statutes precisely; 25 by giving words their plain meanFor the interpretation of statutes, "intent of the legislature" is the criterion, or
test, that is most often recited. An almost overwhelming majority of judicial
opinions on statutory issues are written in the idiom of legislative intent. The
reason for this doubtless lies in an assumption that an obligation to construe
statutes in such a way as to carry out the will, real or attributed, of the lawmaking branch of the government is mandated by principles of separation of powers.
Id. § 45.05. Professor Johnstone noted that "To deny that the plain meaning rule has any
force or validity opens the door to violation of a fundamental objective in statutory interpretation. This position leads to a denial of legislative supremacy in the statutory field."
Johnstone, supra note 13, at 13.
Apart from the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, there are other reasons
why the legislature should reign supreme in policy making. The legislature is far less insulated from the body politic and, in theory, more accountable to the populace. Moreover,
Congress is structured to handle major policy questions; the investigative process, the input
from interest groups and the partisan nature of Congress itself lead to compromise in
public policy determinations. The courts, on the other hand, are not generally accountable
(although they are often influenced by the political tenor of the times) and have limited
data-gathering capabilities. The legislature is typically in a better position to make broadbased, integrated political decisions.
25 It is generally accepted that courts should correct plain drafting errors:
Sometimes a criminal statute is quite obviously worded erroneouslyperhaps containing too much, perhaps containing too little. Suppose a health
statute makes it a crime for a hotel proprietor to permit someone to sleep in a
"hotel, dining room or restaurant." Defendant, a hotel proprietor, lets a guest
sleep in his hotel. Literally, the statute makes him a criminal. Quite obviously,
however, a comma was erroneously inserted between "hotel" and "dining
room"; as the statute is thus corrected by the court, the defendant would not be
guilty.
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 15, at 71-72.
In Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55 (1930), the Supreme Court warned that courts
should exercise restraint in correcting legislative "errors":
Courts have sometimes exercised a high degree of ingenuity in the effort
to find justification for wrenching from the words of a statute a meaning which
literally they did not bear in order to escape consequences thought to be absurd
or to entail great hardship. But an application of the principle so nearly approaches the boundary between the exercise of the judicial power and that of
legislative power as to call rather for great caution and circumspection in order
to avoid the usurpation of the latter.... Laws enacted with good intention,
when put to the test, frequently, and to the surprise of the lawmaker himself,
turn out to be mischievous, absurd or otherwise objectionable. But in such a
case the remedy lies with the law making authority, and not with the courts.
Id. at 60 (citations omitted).
Courts at times have interpreted statutes to avoid manifestly unjust results. See, e.g.,
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (federal statute forbidding the importation of aliens under contract to perform "labor or service of any kind"
held not to include ministers). Sometimes, courts limit an otherwise unconstitutional statute
with judicial glosses to maintain the statute's constitutionality. This exception acknowledges
legislative intent; it must be presumed that the legislature intended to pass a constitutional
law. See I C.D. SANDS, supra note 10, § 2.01; 2 id. § 45.11.
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ing whenever possible, however, courts will effectuate a legislature's true intent and maintain the deference crucial to our notions of separation of powers.
II
THE VALIDITY OF

Rico's

LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION CLAUSE

The congressional directive in RICO requires courts to adopt
a liberal approach when construing ambiguities within the statute.
A minority of courts have declined to adhere to the mandate,
questioning its constitutionality on the ground that due process
requires strict construction of penal statutes.2 6 Additionally, some
critics allege that the directive is an unconstitutional assumption of
judicial power by Congress. These arguments, however, are un27
persuasive. The RICO directive is constitutionally valid.
Moreover, policy considerations weigh in favor of construing
28
RICO liberally.
A. Historical Perspective of Strict Construction
The courts that suggest the Constitution requires strict construction of penal statutes misunderstand the role of constructional aids, but this broad view of due process is not surprising.
American legal history is replete with reiterations of the maxim
that courts must construe penal statutes strictly. As Justice Reed
observed, "[tihat criminal statutes are to be construed strictly is a
proposition which calls for the citation of no authority." 2,
An analysis of the history of strict construction clearly indicates that the maxim is not constitutionally compelled but rather is
a rule that developed during an early era in English law to deal
with a particular situation that is merely a shibboleth of the past.3 0
26 See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d

1358,

1369-70 (8th Cir. 1980);

United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 692 (7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022
(D. Md. 1976), affd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979). See
also United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d 1065, 1069 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). Cf. United States v. Sutton,
605 F.2d 260, 269 (6th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging mandate but construing statute narrowly), vacated and submitted for rehearingen banc April 2, 1980.
27 See notes 29-50 and accompanying text infra.
28 See notes 51-58 and accompanying text infra.
29 United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 50.9 (1954).
30 For an excellent discussion supporting the general abrogation of the rule of strict
construction of penal statutes, see Hall, supra note 11. See generally Rewis v. United States,
401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96 (1820);
R. DICKERSON, supra note 16, at 205-12.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:167

The rule of strict construction arose to ameliorate the harshness
of English law which imposed the death penalty on convicted felons. 31 Beginning with the reign of Henry VIII, and through
1765, the Benefit of Clergy 3 2 was ousted for a number of
felonies. The courts reacted, tempering the severity of the laws by
strictly construing all penal laws. The maxim of strict construction, which had not existed in the sixteenth century, became
firmly established by the mid-seventeenth century.
Colonists carried the rule of strict construction to America via
common law and English legal texts of the period.3 3 American
courts adopted the English rule, but its "unrestrained application"
led Chief Justice Marshall to admonish the courts:
[Tihough penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to
be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the
legislature.... The intention of the legislature is to be collected
from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in
the words, there is no room for construction.

34

The unbridled application of the maxim prompted some
states to abrogate the rule explicitly, first for specific types of statutes and then for entire codes. 3 5 Many states have statutorily
imposed a liberal construction rule, generally requiring courts to
construe statutes according to the "fair import of their terms" to

31 For a historical analysis of strict construction, see Hall, supra note 11, at 749-52. See

generally L. GABEL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES (1928).
32 "According to common law [the benefit of clergy] may be defined as the exemption
of members of the clergy from the jurisdiction of the temporal courts in certain criminal
cases which normally would not have come within the competence of the ecclesiastical
courts." Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
" See, e.g., I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 88 ("Penal statutes must be construed

strictly."). Blackstone described an application of very strict construction:
Thus the statute 1 Edw. VI. c. 12. having enacted that those who are convicted
of stealing horses should not have the benefit of clergy, the judges conceived
that this did not extend to him that should steal but one horse, and therefore
procured a new act for that purpose in the following year. And, to come nearer
our own times, by the statute 14 Geo. II. c.6. stealing sheep, or other cattle, was
made felony without benefit of clergy. But these general words, "or "other cattle," [sic] being looked upon as much too loose to create a capital offense, the
act was held to extend to nothing but mere sheep. And therefore, in the next
sessions, it was found necessary to make another statute, 15 Geo. II. 34. extending the former to bulls, cows, oxen, steers, bullocks, heifers, calves, and lambs,
by name.
Id. (emphasis in original)
31 United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95-96 (1820).
35 See Hall, supra note 11, at 752, 752 n.22.
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effectuate the purposes of the legislature. 3 6 The RICO directive
extends this trend. Because felonies mandating the death penalty
are virtually extinct, the rule of strict construction of penal
statutes-"the sole relic of what had once been a veritable conspiracy for administrative nullification" 37 -has outlived its original
rationale.
B. Fair Warning
The most persuasive modern justification supporting the
general rule of strict construction is that "criminals should be
given fair warning, before they engage in a course of conduct, as
to what conduct is punishable and how severe the punishment
is." 38 This is also one of the reasons underlying the constitution3:
ally compelled "void for vagueness" doctrine .
36 Many states have abrogated the strict construction rule or specifically provided for
liberal construction. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-211 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-203,
1-204 (repealed vol. 1976); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 203
(rev. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 73-102 (1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 131, § 1.01 (1975); IOWA
CODE § 4.2 (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 446.080 (1962); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.2 (MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.192 (Callaghan rev. vol. 1962)); Mo. REV. STAT. § 1.010 (1978); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 45-1-102(2) (1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 29-106 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 625.3 (repealed 1974); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 5 (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 29-01-29 (repl. 1974); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.025(2) (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 22-1-1 (rev. 1979); TENN. CRINI. CODE AND CODE CrINI. P., § 39-105 (Proposed Final Draft,
Nov. 1973); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.05(a) (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-1-106 (1978).
Although many states have not ekpressly abrogated strict construction nor mandated
liberal construction, they have provided that courts should construe the laws "according to
the fair import of their terms" with a view toward effecting their purposes and promoting
justice. See ALA. CODE § 13A-1-6 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-102(1) (repealed 1978);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 701-104 (repealed 1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:3 (West 1974);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.01 (West 1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-106 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 193.030 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-2 (West 1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
9A.04.02(2) (1977).
Only two states specifically require strict construction of penal statutes. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 775.021 (West 1976); 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1928 (Purdon Supp. 1974-78).
37 Hall, supra note 11, at 751.
:3 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,supra note 15, at 72. Mr. justice Holmes, in a famous passage from McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931), said:
Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of
the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should
be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair,
so far as possible the line should be clear.
Id. at 27.
3' For an explanation of the "vagueness doctrine," see Note,

109 U. PA. L. REV. 67

(1960). Compare Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974) ("This rule of narrow construction is rooted in the concern of the law for individual rights, and in the belief
that fair warning should be accorded as to what conduct is criminal and punishable by
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If a statute on its face is unconstitutionally vague, a court will
often adopt a narrow construction to sustain its validity. In contrast, many courts have construed RICO broadly while simultaneously upholding its constitutionality against a vagueness challenge. 40 In United States v. Hawes, 41 for example, the Fifth Circuit
broadly construed the term "enterprise," affirming the conviction
of defendants who had operated an illegal gambling business. In
response to the defendants' claim that the broad construction of
"enterprise" rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague, the
court said that "'any person' of average intelligence, on a clear
reading of that statute, together with relevant definitional provisions, could not help but realize that they would be criminally
liable for participating in 'any enterprise,' including their own,
'through a pattern of racketeering activity.' "42
The vagueness doctrine guarantees that a potential offender
will have adequate notice of the consequences of his future conduct. There is no fair warning problem under RICO because the
act proscribes activities by reference to other state and federal statutes. 43 RICO can only be unconstitutionally vague if a statute

deprivation of liberty or property.") with Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385,
391 (1926) ("[A criminal] statute ... so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application [is unconstitutionally vague].").
Two principal postulates have grown out of the philosophy that an individual's life and liberty are to be vigilantly safeguarded. One rule is that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed; the other, that a statute which fails to
meet certain requirements for definiteness of standard is not a legal basis for
punishment. These approaches are often the same because they are rooted in
the same basic consideration and because the distinction between them is
primarily one of degree. Thus, the question in strict construction is whether
particular conduct falls within the scope of the statute. The problem of vagueness, on the other hand, presents this question and in addition the question
whether a court or individual ever can tell when conduct is or is not included
and therefore whether the statute should fall completely.
Quarles, supra note 19, at 532.
40 See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1364-65 (8th Cir. 1980) ("Some defendants have challenged the constitutionality of RICO on the grounds of vagueness and
double jeopardy, but no court yet has found the Act unconstitutional.") (footnote omitted);
Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68; Broadest of
the Criminal Statutes, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 18 (1978).
41 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
42 Id. at 479.
13 As used in this chapter(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic
or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under
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defining an underlying predicate offense is impermissibly vague.
Assuming that the predicate crimes are adequately defined, a person seeking to comply with the law need not speculate whether his
action will violate RICO; he need only eschew violating an under-lying offense. Futhermore, RICO requires the commission of at
least two racketeering acts, which also provides the would-be
offender with sufficient notice that his actions may subject him to
the additional penalties imposed by RICO. Finally, to the extent
that the activities proscribed in RICO are malum in se rather than
malum prohibitum, courts should apply a more relaxed standard of
44
what constitutes fair warning.
any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201
(relating to bribery), Section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472,
and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section
664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1034 (relating to the
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section
1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section
1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section
1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare
fund payments) section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling
businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on
payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with
a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing
in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United
States ....
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (Supp. III 1979).
44
The soundest rationale [for the rule of strict construction] is that all potential violators are entitled to fair warning. Here, it is useful to distinguish crimes
that involve acts generally assumed to be antisocial (malum in se), in which a
warning tends to inhere in the act itself, from crimes involving acts that are
wrong only becatse they have been officially proscribed (malum prohibitum),
which require independent warnings.
A rule of strict interpretation or application seems unjustified where the
statute carries a strong probable meaning of criminality (even though it may
not be entirely free of doubt) or where an independent warning is unneeded
(malum in se).
R. DICKERSON, supra note 16, at 209-11. All of the predicate crimes listed by RICO as
racketeering acts are arguably malum in se. The state crimes incorporated by reference in
RICO are among the oldest and most heinous crimes. In addition, the federal crimes all
carry a strong probable meaning of criminality. See generally United States v. Nardello, 393
U.S. 286 (1969).
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C. Separation of Powers
Some critics allege that the RICO directive violates the separation of powers doctrine by delegating legislative power to the
judiciary.'- A liberal construction directive, however, strengthens,
rather than violates, the separation of powers principles. Through
the directive, the legislature informs the judiciary how to resolve
statutory ambiguities. 46 The directive is analogous to statutory definitions indicating the special meaning the legislature attaches to
a particular word or phrase in the statute. No one seriously

The argument is sometimes advanced that strict construction of criminal
statutes is advisable because of the separation of powers among the branches of
government. This argument must assume that courts punish or legislate when
they construe statutes liberally or at least non-strictly and that the power to
punish is given to the legislature alone. The answer to this proposition is obvious. It is the primary duty of the legislature rather than the judiciary to make
the law, but the courts often make law by confining or broadening the principles of the common law. The function of the courts is primarily to construe or
interpret the laws, but this requirement does not mean that the courts should
construe or interpret the law in,any particular manner. Separation of powers is
a doctrine which may militate against the validity of a statute when the statute
is so vague as actually to have no meaning. If a court should by interpretation
or construction give vitality to a meaningless combination of words, it would
undoubtedly be legislating and its action would be obnoxious to general principles of government in this country. But when a statute is ambiguous, interpretation is necessary. And if the court is "making law" when it interprets
the statute, it is making law regardless of whether its interpretation is strict or
liberal. To say that a court is legislating when it construes a statute to include
doubtful conduct seems to require the concession that a strict construction , by
limiting the operation of the statute, repeals the statute in part, and thus legislates just as fully as in the converse situation.
Quarles, supra note 19, at 534.
46 [S]uch provisions [legislative mandates for liberal construction] can be
rationalized as requests to the courts to stop subverting normal meanings
under the guise of "interpretation." Rather than a legislative intrusion into the
province of the courts, it may merely be an attempt, in the form of a rule of
law, to keep the courts from paying insufficient deference to its pronouncements in the field of policy making, and thus from usurping the functions of
the legislature.
C. NUTTING, S. ELLIOT, & R. DICKERSON, LEGISLATION 397 (1969). See R. DICKERSON, supra
note 16, at 209; Hall, supra note 11, at 757. In response to the claim that a liberal construction clause results in legislative usurpation of the judicial function of interpreting the
law, one commentator argues:
Any serious suggestion at this day that since interpretation is a judicial function
a general interpretive act, applicable only to future statutes, would be unconstitutional, could hardly be taken seriously. In both England and America we
have long proceeded on the basis that, although ultimate interpretation is for
the courts, it is within the legislative province to lay down rules of interpretation for the future.
Fordham & Leach, supra note 20, at 448.
45
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doubts the power of the legislature to define words as it wishes.4 7
Similarly, the directive provides the judiciary with a clear indication of the legislature's often amorphous intent. In essence, the
directive prescribes the attitude that courts should adopt when
8
4
construing the statute.

D. Policy Justifications Favoring Liberal Construction
Policy reasons support abandoning the strict construction
maxim. The rule of strict construction encourages a court to look
for ambiguities in the law. To laymen, when a court construes a
statute strictly, the court seems to rely on fine technicalities and
dubious distinctions rather than a commonsense reading of the
words in the statute. Roscoe Pound warned that "[t]he public cannot be relied upon permanently to tolerate judicial obstruction or
nullification of the social policies to which more and more it is
compelled to be committed." ", Consequently, liberal construction
may bolster public confidence in the legal system by making the
law appear more rational.5 0
Liberal construction clauses provide legislatures with the opportunity to exercise their legislative responsibility to the fullest by
providing guidance to courts struggling with ambiguities in the
statute. Given the great incidence of ambiguity in statutes and the
myriad of conflicting constructional aids that are available, few
people attempting to abide by a statute can have confidence in
17 See IA C.D. SANDS, supra note 10, at §§ 20.08, 27.02.
See 2A C.D. SANDS, supra note 10, at § 58.01. Notwithstanding a legislative mandate,
some courts have ignored or refused to apply liberal construction clauses. See W. LAFAVE &
A. ScorT, CRIMINAL LAW 73, 73 n.26 (1972); Hall, supra note 11, at 754-55. For examples
of cases that have ignored the mandate in RICO, see United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp.
609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("pattern" construed as requiring more than accidental or unrelated
behavior); United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975) (narrowly construing "enterprise" to legitimate businesses) (overruled by implication in United States v.
Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977)). Similarly, courts
often ignore liberal construction clauses that abrogate the common law rule of strict construction:
The effectiveness of the statutes is very difficult to determine. Presumably,
if followed in good spirit they would bring about wider applications of primary
statutes but this can hardly be demonstrated in fact. One cannot be sure that,
absent the interpretive provision, the result would have been different in a particular case. We can say that they, by and large, have served to take away one
formulation otherwise available to explain a restrictive interpretation. The statutes have not universally achieved even this much. There have been cases
where they were ignored and the old canon applied.
Fordham & Leach, supra note 20, at 450-51.
'" Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 407 (1908).
.o See Hall, supra note 11, at 760, 760 n.63.
48
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their understanding of a law until after a court has opted for one
or more of the possible constructional aids and has interpreted
the statute. 51 Mr. Justice Jackson once bemoaned this unpredictability and suggested that interpretive provisions would ameliorate
the situation by requiring or limiting the choice of construction
open to the court. 5 2 Although not a substitute for careful drafting, interpretational provisions give Congress some control over
the attitude courts will adopt, enhancing the likelihood that the
construction will reflect the true intent of Congress.
The Supreme Court has never held that strict construction of
penal statutes is constitutionally compelled. 5 3 In fact, the Court
has occasionally exempted statutes from the rule.-4 A persuasive
argument can be made that even without a legislative directive,
courts should construe most penal statutes liberally. As Professor
Hall, the leading proponent of this view, has stated, "there is no
sound reason for a general doctrine of strict construction of penal
statutes, and primafacie all such should have as liberal a construc51 The custom of remaking statutes to fit their histories has gone so far that a

formal Act, read three times and voted on by Congress and approved by the
President, is no longer a safe basis on which a lawyer may advise his client, or a
lower Court decide a case.
Yet, as matters stand today, I do not see how Congress can know, even
roughly, the effect that will ultimately be given to any language it may use.
Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes, 34 A.B.A.J. 535, 538 (1948).
52 Though it would not dispel all the doubts which are inherent in the situation,
it would help give objectivity to the process of interpretation and assurance to
drafting of statutes, if we could have general acceptance by the bench as well
as the Bar of a few basic principles of statutory construction.
Id.
,3 Two cases commonly cited to support the proposition that strict construction is constitutionally mandated are Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) and Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955). See United States v. Mandel. 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md.
1976); United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Conn. 1975). In Rewis the Court
noted that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor
of lenity." 401 U.S. at 812 (citing Bell) (emphasis added). The Court, however, also observed in Reuws that "the questions in this case are solely statutory. No issue of constitutional dimension is presented." Id. at 811 n.5. Moreover, the use of the word "should" in
Bell and Rewis suggests that the strict construction rule is prudential rather than mandatory.
4 See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (Narcotic Drugs Import and Export
Act); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948) (Federal Escape Act) ("The canon in
favor of strict construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and
evident statutory purpose."); New York Cent. R.R. v. United States, 265 U.S. 41 (1924)
(Safety Appliance Act); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. United States, 244 U.S. 336 (1917)
(Hours of Service Act held "remedial" and therefore subject to liberal construction);
United States v. Kordel, 164 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1947), (Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act), afjfd, 335 U.S. 345 (1948).
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tion as statutes generally, [except for] certain penal statutes
[which] should be strictly construed to avoid injustice." -' ' Fortunately, Congress has obviated the necessity of arguing for a general rule of liberal construction in RICO by including a specific
mandate in the statute.
Significant policy considerations support Congress's decision
to include a liberal construction provision in RICO. In enacting
RICO, Congress intended to curtail and ideally eliminate the debilitating effect of racketeering activity on American society.
Furthermore, Congress was concerned about the general deleterious impact of organized crime on commerce. To effectively attack
these perceived evils,5 6 Congress enacted a very broad and strin5 Hall, supra note 11, at 762-63 (footnote omitted). Professor Hall does not suggest
that all penal statutes should be liberally construed under all circumstances. He would
exempt the following situations from application of a general rule of liberal construction:
(1) "A statute imposing a penalty which the court regards as disproportionately heavy ...
as compared with the culpability of the conduct which is sought to be penalized." Id. at
763-64 (footnote omitted); (2) "Where an honest attempt is... made by those to whom the
law applies to ascertain the precise limits of the legal sanction imposed ... in the regulation
of business practices for the social welfare .... " Id. at 764-65 (footnote omitted); (3) "[Ol1d
legislation which is inapplicable [because of] changed social or economic conditions ...
Id. at 767 (footnote omitted).
5' The Congressional statement of "Findings and Purpose" indicates the severity of the
problem Congress was tackling.
STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a
highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains
billions of dollars .from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal
use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangrous drugs, and other forms
of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United
States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously
burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and
undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized
crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of
the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary
to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in
the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering
process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922-23.
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gent statute. Consistent with its goal of using innovative measures
to tackle a severe problem, 7 Congress provided a liberal construction clause to ensure that RICO would have the greatest possible
impact on the problem of racketeering. Because no constitutional
impediments deny Congress's ability to provide interpretational
clauses, courts have no basis for refusing to obey the express lib5 8
eral construction mandate in RICO.
III
APPLYING RICO's LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION DIRECTIVE

To illustrate the application of the general principles developed above, it is helpful to analyze one of the most controversial questions arising under RICO-the scope of the term "enterprise." The Act defines "enterprise" to include "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not

51 See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79, 80 (1969). Professor Hall anticipated
the emergence of this trend as early as 1935:
Changing conditions of modern civilization, and the growth of scientific
knowledge on criminology, render imperative a new approach to the problems
of crime. New categories of crimes and criminals cannot always be accurately
defined on the first attempt. Shall the new machinery be nullified from the
start under the guise of "strict construction", or shall it be carried out liberally
in the spirit in which it is conceived? Merely to state the issue is to answer it.
Hall, supra note 11, at 761 (footnotes omitted).
51 In United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997 (D. Md. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated and
remanded in part, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979), the district court limited the scope of
RICO's liberal construction clause by holding it inapplicable to criminal provisions. The
court distinguished the statute's penal (criminal) provisions from its remedial (civil) provisions. Professor Sands had previously noted the inadequacy of such an approach:
It is an oversimplification to say that an act will be given a liberal or strict
interpretation depending, for example, on the single factor of its being either
remedial or penal, respectively, since a particular statute may be both penal and
at the same time also remedial, in the sense that all original legislation is passed
to remedy some prior "evil" in society's arrangements.
2A C.D. SANDS, supra note 10, at 461. More important, RICO's liberal construction clause
on its face refers to "the provisions of this title" without distinguishing further. If Congress
had intended to limit the scope of the directive, it easily could have inserted a modifier
before the word "provision." But see United States v. Grzywacz, 603 F.2d 682, 692 (7th Cir.
1979) (Swygert, J., dissenting) ("It is unclear whether Congress intended its directive to
apply to those sections which establish criminal liability or merely to the 'remedial' provisions of Title IX."), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2152 (1980); United States v. Davis, 576 F.2d
1065, 1071 (3d Cir.) (Aldisert, J., concurring) ("[Section 904] must be read in light of the
language of the statute and the legislative history. And in viewing the legislative purpose, I
detect nothing that precludes the application of the rule of narrow construction of penal
statutes."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978). See also Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the
Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IowA L. REV. 837, 860 n.126 (1980).
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a legal entity." 5' Defense counsel have attempted to convince
courts that the term "enterprise" is ambiguous,6 0 arguing that the
legislative history of the Act indicates that RICO's sole purpose is
to prevent infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses and, therefore, that RICO does not apply to enterprises
established soley for illicit purposes. 6 '
Most of the circuit courts of appeals that have considered the
issue have broadly construed the term "enterprise. '6 2 In United
States v. Sutton,63 however, the Sixth Circuit held that a RICO enterprise must be "organized and acting for some ostensibly lawful
purpose." 64 The court, therefore, reversed the RICO convictions
9 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
60 The liberal construction clause in RICO should apply only when a court has found

an ambiguity in the statute. Because the Supreme Court has observed that the Organized
Crime Control Act "is a carefully crafted piece of legislation," (Ianelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 789 (1975)), courts should presume that the meaning of a particular word or
phrase in the Act is plain rather than equivocal.
"1 Compare United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 267 (6th Cir. 1979) ("The construction unmistakenly endorsed by the legislative history is the one appellants have urgedlimiting section 1962(e) to the conduct of a 'legitimate' enterprise's affairs through racketeering activity."), vacated and submitted for rehearing en banc April 2, 1980, with United
States v.Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 897 (5th Cir. 1978) ("On its face and in light of its legislative
history, the Act clearly encompasses ... 'enterprises which 'are from their inception organized for illicit purposes.'" (quoting United States v. McLauren, 557 F.2d 1064, 1073
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978))), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978).
62 See United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 992-93 (3d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Baker, 617 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Whitehead, 618 F.2d 523,
525 n.1 (4th Cir., 1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 302-06 (7th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568, (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1345
(1980); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 933 (1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 896-99 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). But see United States v. Turkette, No. 79-1545, slip op. at
2-19 (1st Civ. Sept. 23, 1980); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1364-65 (8th Cir.
1980). In United States v. Sutton, 60:5 F.2d 260, 270 (6th Cir. 1979), the Sixth Circuit also
construed "enterprise" narrowly. Subsequently, however, the court vacated the decision
and reheard the case en banc. The Tenth Circuit has not considered the issue.
63 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated and submittedfor rehearingen banc April 2, 1980.
64 Id. at 270. In United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), the
Eighth Circuit made a similar argument:
We hold that Congress intended that the phrase "a group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity," as used in its definition of the
term "enterprise" in section 1961(4), to encompass only an association having
an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the "pattern
of racketeering activity."
According to the Anderson court, the holding differs from Sutton "only to extent that we do
not rest our holding on the word 'legitimate' but rather on the need for a discrete
economic association existing separately from the racketeering activity." Id. at 30. See also
Bradley, supra note 58, at 854-55.
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of defendants who had organized for the sole purpose of engaging in criminal activities. Although the court subsequently vacated
the decision and reheard the case en banc, the original panel's
opinion provides a useful context for examining the application of
RICO's liberal construction clause.
In Sutton, nine defendants had been convicted under RICO
for conducting a racketeering enterprise. The Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit determined that by construing the term "enterprise" to include solely illegitimate organizations, the district
court had effectively read the enterprise requirement out of the
statute. The Court of Appeals argued that under the lower court's
broad interpretaton, every "pattern of racketeering activity" z,
would also be an "enterprise," thus eliminating the separate enterprise requirement."66
Although the court's argument has surface appeal, its
rationale does not withstand close scrutiny. The Sutton court failed
to recognize that the terms "enterprise" and "pattern of racketeering activity" are not coterminous even in solely illegitimate organizations. "Enterprise" describes the unit of organization required
under the statute. "Pattern of racketeering activity" describes the
type of activity in which the enterprise must engage to violate the
statute.
Moreover, by holding that a solely illegitimate organization is
not an "enterprise," the court ignored the plain meaning of
RICO, which does not limit its prohibitions to legitimate enterprises. Rather, it includes any enterprise, 67 although Congress

-5 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976) (defining "pattern of racketeering activity" under
RICO).
66
It requires no great insight to recognize that applying the statute in [the
fashion suggested by the government] renders the "enterprise" element of the
crime wholly redundant and transforms the statute into a simple proscription
against "patterns of racketeering activity." Under [this approach] every "pattern of racketeering activity" becomes an "enterprise" whose affairs are conducted through the "pattern of racketeering activity." Plainly, that is not the
statute Congress has written.
United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 265-66 (6th Cir. 1979), vacated and submitted for
rehearing en banc April 2, 1980. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1369 (8th
Cir. 1980) ("[T]he Government proved the enterprise element of the offense solely by
evidence indicating an association to commit the pattern of racketeering activity. This interpretation of the statute effectively eliminated the enterprise element of the offense.").
67
In fashioning the statute, Congress promulgated a broad legislative scheme
to encompass a variety of criminal activities, regardless of their direct effect on
legitimate business. The words "legitimate" or "illegitimate" appear nowhere in
Title IX, and nowhere does Congress evince an intent to make such a distinc-
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could easily have limited the statute by inserting the word "legitimate" before the word "enterprise." 68
Assuming, arguendo, that the Sutton court correctly rejected
the plain meaning doctrine, its narrow construction of the word
"enterprise" is still unjustifiable in light of RICO's liberal construction directive. The court stated that the liberal construction clause,
tion. Section 1962(c) does not restrict "enterprise" to a legitimate one only because it uses the words "any enterprise." Further, § 1961(4) provides an allencompasing definition of enterprise, including "any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Broad and unrestricted
use of the term "enterprise" appears throughout Title IX. Given the presence
of the wholly unencumbered term "any enterprise" throughout the statute, we
hold that its use in § 1962(c) manifests an intent to proscribe the conduct of
specified activities through a pattern of racketeering activity, regardless of the
type of enterprise involved.
United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1345
(1980). See United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977). But see United States v. Turkette, No. 79-1545, slip op. at 6 (1st Cir. Sept. 23,
1980) ("[Tlhe government uses the word 'any' to engraft into the section a phrase that is not
there: 'enterprise includes' wholly criminal activity.")
68 In United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1366 (8th Cir. 1980), the court applied
the ejusdem generis rule of statutory construction to show that the language of RICO is not
plain, and therefore, that the court should "probe more deeply into the statutory language
and structure."
The syntactical form of the section 1961(4) definition warrants application
of the traditional maxim of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis. The definition sets forth two conjunctive phrases, listing the types of groups included in
the definition of "enterprise." The first phrase describes legal entities: "individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity." The second
phrase refers to non-legal entitles: "any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." In this case, the enterprise charged
in the indictment allegedly falls within the category of a "group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity." We find that these general words
are ejusdem generis to the previous words defining types of groups which can
constitute an enterprise. The meaning of the general phrase, "group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity," is thus controlled by the
preceding specifically enumerated examples.
Id. According to the doctrine of ejusdem generis, "[w]here general words follow specific
words in an enumeration describing the legal subject, the general words are construed to
embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding
specific words." 2A C.D. SANDS, supra note 10, at § 47.17.
The Anderson court clearly misused the doctrine. The court noted that the first half of
the definition of "enterprise" applies to legal entities. Certainly, it makes sense to define
the scope of "other legal entity" with reference to the more specific enumerations. The
second phrase of the definition, however, is conjunctive, referring to "any union or group
of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." In other words, the second
phrase expands the definition to include all non-legal entities associated in fact. The second phrase does not pertain to the class enumerated by the specific examples in the first
clause (legal entities). Consequently, the doctrine of ejusdem generis has no application. In
addition, the very use of this doctrine contravenes the liberal construction directive because
ejusdem generis is a form of strict construction. See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87,
90-91 (1975).
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by its own terms, should only be used to effectuate RICO's remedial purpose. The court concluded that by limiting the scope of
"enterprise" to legitimate organizations, it was fully serving the
Act's sole remedial purpose. "
The Sutton court attempted to support its position by relying
on the Act's legislative history.7 0 The court cited many different

69 The Sutton court explained:

Although Congress has declared that RICO's provisions should be "liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purpose," we do not read that directive as
authorizing us to write a new and substantially different law. Appellants' construction [limiting the scope of "enterprise" to legitimate organizations] fully
serves the statute's remedial purpose.
605 F.2d at 269 (emphasis added). Apparently, the Sutton court misread the liberal construction directive. The directive clearly refers to the statute's "remedial purposes." The
Sutton court twice referred to "purpose." This misreading may have led the court to believe
that the statute had only one remedial purpose-the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate businesses-a conclusion that the explicitness of the directive
belies. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d & 1358, 1370 (8th Cir. 1980) (referring to
RICO's "remedial purpose") (emphasis added).
70 The court found the legislative history to be "remarkable for the clarity with which it
speaks to the issue of the intended scope of the 'enterprise' element of the crime .... The
construction unmistakably endorsed by the legislative history is the one appellants have
urged-limiting section 1962(c) to the conduct of a 'legitimate' enterprise's affairs through
racketeering activity." 605 F.2d at 266-67. See United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358,
1371 (8th Cir. 1980) ("The relevant legislative history bolsters our interpretation of the
definition of a RICO enterprise.").
Although a questionable practice, courts customarily turn to legislative history to resolve specific questions concerning the ambit of a statute. Too often courts view legislative
history as a panacea rather than an occasionally useful aid to clarification. A court, however, should rarely turn to legislative history when the language of the statute is clear.
It would be anomalous to close our minds to persuasive evidence of intention
on the ground that reasonable men could not differ as to the meaning of the
words. Legislative materials may be without probative value, or contradictory,
or ambiguous, it is true, and in such cases will not be permitted to control the
customary meaning of words or overcome rules of syntax or construction found
by experience to be workable; they can scarcely be deemed to be incompetent
or irrelevant.
United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940).
This position is not universally accepted. The English judiciary generally recoils at the
suggestion that legislative history be used to discern the "intent" of Parliament. See generally
R. DIAs, JURISPRUDENCE 218-45 (4th ed. 1976). Professor Dickerson persuasively argues

that "[t]he more realistic approach to legislative history would be to end or severely limit its
judicial use." R. DICKERSON, supra note 16, at 195.

In Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), Justice Jackson
presented a forceful and eloquent critique of judicial use of legislative history:
Resort to legislative history is only justified where the face of the Act is
inescapably ambiguous, and then I think we should not go beyond Committee
reports, which presumably are well considered and carefully prepared.... It is
the business of Congress to sum up its own debates in its legislation. Moreover,
it is only the words of the bill that have presidential approval, where that approval is given. It is not to be supposed that, in signing a bill the President
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legislative sources supporting the proposition that the only purpose of RICO is the "elimination of the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in
interstate commerce." 71 In drawing this conclusion, the court fell
prey to a logical fallacy. The court erroneously drew the negative
implication that "enterprise" does not encompass solely illegitimate organizations from the affirmative statement that "enterprise" does encompass legitimate organizations. Although it is true
that the purpose found by the Sutton court is the primary, purpose
of the statute, it does not follow that it is the sole purpose.7 2 This

endorses the whole Congressional Record. For us to undertake to reconstruct
an enactment from legislative history is merely to involve the Court in political
controversies which are quite proper in the enactment of a bill but should have
no place in its interpretation.
Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possible the meaning which an enactment reveals on its face, Laws are intended for
all of our people to live by; and the people go to law offices to learn what their
rights under those laws are.... Aside from a few offices in the larger cities, the
materials of legislative history are not available to the lawyer who can afford
neither the cost of acquisition, the cost of housing, or the cost of repeatedly
examining the whole congressional history. Moreover, if he could, he would not
know any way of anticipating what would impress enough members of the
Court to be controlling. To accept legislative debates to modify statutory provisions is to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the country.
By and large, I think our function was well stated by Mr. justice Holmes:
"We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute
means."
Id. at 395-97 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
71 605 F.2d at 267 (quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969)).
72 One of the bill's primary sponsors, Senator McClellan, realized this. In an oft-quoted
passage, he noted that the bill has a broad scope aimed at the activities normally engaged in
by organized crime.
[The New York] city bar committee attacks title IX and the statement in the
Senate report that the list of crimes the commission of which constitutes one
element of the prohibitions in title IX is a list of "specific State and Federal
criminal statutes now characteristically violated by members of organized
crime." The bar committee complains that the list is too inclusive, since it includes offenses which often are committed by persons not engaged in organized crime. The Senate report does not claim, however, that the listed offenses are committed primarily by members of organized crime, only that those
offenses are characteristic of organized crime. The listed offenses lend themselves to organized commercial expolitation, unlike some other offenses such as
rape, and experience has shown they are commonly committed by participants
in organized crime. That is all the title IX list of offenses purports to be, that is
all the Senate report claims it to be, and that is all it should be.
McClellan, supra note 2, at 142-43 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the scope of RICO's proscriptions. In
lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975) (§ 1955 illegal gambling case), the Court stated
that "Title IX ...seeks to prevent the infiltration of legitimate business operations affecting interstate commerce by individuals who have obtained investment capital from a pat-
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view is buttressed by the title of the statute, "Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations." 73 If Congress had intended the Act
to apply only to legitimate organizations, the title "Racketeer Influenced Organizations" would have sufficed. Instead, Congress
indicated that "Corrupt Organizations" are also within the purview of the act. Any other reading of the statute renders the
words "and Corrupt Organizations" surplusage.
Moreover, contrary to the Sutton court's assertion, the legislative history is hardly clear. For example, although one commentator stated that "ihe published legislative history of Title IX ...
convincingly indicates that Congress aimed exclusively at legitimate organizations," 74 another commentator found that the
"legislative history supports the broad interpretation of 'enterprise' as encompassing illegitimate organizations." 1- Most of the
76
circuits considering the issue have adopted the latter view.

The plain meaning of the statute covers illegitimate enterprises. The legislative history is equivocal. The liberal construction
clause mandates that the court resolve doubts in favor of the state.
Accordingly, courts should construe "enterprise" to include solely
illegitimate organizations. The result is not unfair. People engaged in solely illicit enterprises pose a pernicious threat to society. Therefore, "acceptance of the broad definition of 'enterprise'
used by Congress fully comports with the stated Congressional
goal of arresting the infiltration of regular commerce by organized crime." 77

tern of racketeering activity." Id. at 787 n.19 (dicta). Some courts have inferred that this
was RICO's sole purpose. The Fifth Circuit, however, recognized that this is an overly
expansive interpretation of lanelli:
Although we quite agree with [the lanelli] statement, we see no indication
that it was intended to describe fully, or to limit, the ambit of the Act's coverage. The appellants would have us read the footnote in question in a manner
reminiscent of the principle of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, adopting the view that the Court has by negative implication excluded
thoroughly illicit businesses from the Act's proscriptions. This we decline to do
absent a clearer and fuller directive from the Court.
United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1073 (5th Cir. 1977).
73 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
71 Comment, Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues
Arising In Its Interpretation, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 89, 98 (1977) (footnote omitted).
7 See Atkinson, supra note 40, at 13.
7' See note 62 supra.
77 United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979).
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CONCLUSION

In the final analysis, the construction of RICO, or any other
law, reduces to a commonsense reading of the statute. The words
of the statute-the culmination of the legislative process-deserve
the utmost deference. Because they embody the objective intent of
the legislature, the words should be given their plain meaning
whenever possible.
When a statute is ambiguous, courts must decide whether to
construe the language liberally or strictly. Congress has, through
the liberal construction clause, mandated the approach the courts
should adopt when construing RICO. Unquestionably, RICO is a
broad statute designed to provide prosecutors and plaintiffs with
an effective weapon against organized crime. It it catches too
many in its broad criminal net, it is for Congress to amend the
law, and not for the courts to emasculate it under the guise of
interpretation.
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Craig W. Palm
78 As this Note went to press, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc, decided

United States v. Sutton, No. 78-5134-39, slip op. (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1980). See notes 62-77
and accompanying text supra. In a split decision, the court, contrary to the vacated panel
decision, held that the term "enterprise" unambiguously included wholly illegitimate organizations. Id. at 13. (Alternatively, the court found that an "ostensibly legitimate" enterprise was involved. Id. at 16.)
Relying on the plain language of the statute's definition of enterprise, the cotrt refused to invoke the canon of strict construction "particularly [because] Congress provided
specifically that [RICO] 'Be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."' Id. at
13 (citation omitted). The majority's rationale and holding in this portion of the opinion
substantially comports with the analysis and conclusions of this Note.
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